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Firms not only create formal groupings in a multilateral fashion (explicit alliance 
constellations) but also engage in informal networks comprised of firms that have more bilateral 
ties to one another than to firms outside their group (implicit constellations).   Using data from 
global airlines, we find that explicit constellations tend to grow by luring firms holding diverse 
resources and that are associated with key members through an implicit group.  Explicit 
associations also tend to exhibit more inertia than implicit ones.    
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  Constellations are alliances among multiple autonomous firms, such that these groups 
compete against each other in the same or similar industries for both clients and members 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1994).  Evidence on the formation of such groups pervades the literature, 
including industries as diverse as computer and microprocessors (Axelrod, Mitchell, Thomas, 
Bennett, & Bruderer, 1995; Hwang & Burgers, 1997; Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001), 
telecommunications (Joshi, Kashlak, & Sherman, 1998), financial services (Domowitz, 1995), 
automobiles (Burgers, Hill, & Kim, 1993; Garcia-Point & Nohria, 2002; Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 
1991) and global airlines, the focus of this study (Hanlon, 1999; ter Kuile, 1997).  Constellations 
differ from simple bilateral, dyadic alliances because they are a “collection of several alliances” 
among players in a certain industry (Das & Teng, 2002: 446).  In contrast, bilateral alliances tend 
to involve agreements that are narrowed to a particular domain (such as a codesharing agreement 
between two airlines).  Being more comprehensive, constellations generally define patterns of 
competition where rivalry shifts, to some degree, from firms to groups of firms (Gomes-
Casseres, 1994).  Thus, decisions to form constellations are likely to have profound strategic 
implications, as a firm’s performance may crucially depend on which group it chooses to join 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Gulati, 1998).   
Despite the pervasiveness of constellations in several industries, we know relatively little 
about how these groups emerge because past research has focused on the formation of dyadic 
ties among firms (e.g. Chung & Singh, 2000; Gulati, 1995b; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Li & 
Rowley, 2002; Martin & Park, 2002; Stuart, 1998).  Although some studies do analyze 
constellations (Burgers et al., 1993; Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991; Vanhaverbeke & 
Noorderhaven, 2001; Walker, 1988), they do not examine in detail the determinants of group 
formation and the dynamics of the process.  In this study, we make an initial attempt to examine 
these issues, using data from 75 global airlines and their alliances.  The airline industry has 
witnessed a surge in alliances between carriers, in part because regulatory barriers prevent access 
to global resources and markets through the outright acquisition of domestic airport facilities or 
carriers (e.g. Hanlon, 1999; Oum & Yu, 1998).  Thus, alliances become a crucial mechanism for   4
carriers to internalize interfirm externalities in the form of international traffic flows (Oum & 
Yu, 1998; Park & Zhang, 2000; Park & Martin, 2001).  Besides simple bilateral ties (such as 
codesharing and marketing agreements), in the mid 1990s carriers began to form groupings of 
firms competing for traffic, some of them associated with brand names (Star Alliance, Oneworld, 
SkyTeam, etc.).  Estimates indicate that these groupings contributed to almost 60% of the global 
air traffic in 2001, representing 203.3 billion dollars in revenues (Baker, 2001).  Thus, although 
focusing on the airline industry may prevent the generalization of our results to other contexts, it 
nonetheless provides a rich setting to test initial hypotheses related to the formation and 
evolution of constellations. 
 
CONSTELLATIONS: EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT 
We are particularly interested in studying the co-evolution of two types of constellations: 
explicit and implicit (Lazzarini, 2002).  Explicit constellations involve formal, publicly known 
agreements with a multilateral fashion in that such agreements tend to be broad and general (i.e., 
applied to all members).  These formal constellations are also publicly known; in most cases, 
they are even associated with brand names, and their members constitute separate entities and 
committees to manage the affairs of the group.  In the airline industry, explicit constellations 
have emerged especially in the mid 1990s, including the Star Alliance (with United Airlines, 
Lufthansa, SAS, etc.), Oneworld (with American Airlines, British Airways, Quantas, etc.), Sky 
Team (with Delta Airlines, Air France, etc.), among others.  Coalitions of international financial 
exchanges (Domowitz, 1995) and formal R&D consortia (Axelrod et al., 1995; Hwang & 
Burgers, 1997; Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001) are also examples of explicit 
constellations. 
Implicit constellations, by contrast, are informal groupings “implied” from the structure 
of bilateral agreements between firms, in such a way that members have relatively more bilateral 
ties to one another than to firms outside the constellation (Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991).  In some 
cases, implicit constellations may also be “expanded” versions of explicit constellations in that   5
they may include firms directly or indirectly tied to key (not necessarily all) members of the 
latter.  Supposing that interfirm linkages are conduits of knowledge and exchange opportunities, 
the configuration of ties describing an implicit constellation implies that a firm will more likely 
benefit from the externalities emanating from the members of the constellation—for instance, 
access to certain consumer markets or technologies—than from other actors.  Using clustering 
algorithms, researchers have revealed such informal groupings of firms in industries such as 
automobiles (Burgers et al., 1993; Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991) and microprocessors 
(Vanhaverbeke & Noorderhaven, 2001).   
In the airline industry, there is evidence that implicit airline constellations have existed 
before the emergence of explicit groups and in most cases appear to be expanded coalitions with 
explicit constellations as their core group.  Consider Figure 1 as an example.  The figure depicts 
a subset of firms in our sample, directly or indirectly associated with the Star Alliance (explicit) 
constellation in early 2000.  The thin lines represent bilateral ties—either alliances or equity 
stakes between two carriers.   The thick, dashed circle includes members of the Star Alliance in 
that period.  We see that some carriers that were not formal members of the explicit group were, 
to some extent, connected with some formal members.  For instance, British Midland Airways 
(bmi) had bilateral ties with Air Canada, Air New Zealand, Austrian Airlines, Lufthansa, SAS, 
and United Airlines but was not a member of the Star Alliance until July 2000, when the carrier 
joined the explicit constellation.  Other carriers, such as Emirates, Malaysia Airlines, South 
African Airways and Virgin Atlantic, were non-members but held bilateral ties with members of 
the group.  This expanded group including both members of the explicit constellation and non-
members suggests the existence of an implicit constellation.     
<Figure 1 around here> 
Several questions emerge in this context.  What determines the formation of explicit and 
implicit constellations and their co-evolution?  Does the bmi case discussed before generalize to 
other cases, i.e., is the expansion of explicit constellations based on the inclusion of firms that 
were previously associated with members through an implicit constellation?  In other words, do   6
implicit associations between firms tend to become more “formalized” over time?  Or, 
alternatively, does the formation of explicit constellations set the stage for a reorganization of 
bilateral ties among firms such that the configuration of implicit constellations will change?   
These are some of the research questions that we attempt to tackle in this study.   
 
HYPOTHESES 
  A common finding of the literature on alliances is that firms have to select in the future 
partners with whom they have transacted in the past (e.g. Gulati, 1995b; Gulati & Gargiulo, 
1999; Li & Rowley, 2002; Martin & Park, 2002; Stuart, 1998).  Through repeated interaction, 
firms develop shared norms and trust, thereby prompting the continuity of the relationship (e.g. 
Gulati, 1995a; Macneil, 1980; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).   Firms may also have a tendency to 
persist in a certain course of action, and hence maintain their association, due to the development 
of joint routines and common investments in non-redeployable assets (Blau, 1964; Levinthal & 
Fichman, 1988; Levinthal & March, 1993).  Therefore, alliances tend to exhibit inertia: in a 
network of agents, similar sets of partners are expected to keep their relationship in the future. 
  We are particularly interested in how this effect may differ between explicit and implicit 
constellations.  Recall that explicit constellations involve multilateral agreements that jointly 
formalize the association of the whole network of firms, and in some cases are even associated 
with joint non-redeployable investments in brand name, common administrative structures, and 
information technology.  In contrast, implicit constellations are informal groupings whose 
composition is basically defined by the configuration of bilateral ties.  Differently from explicit 
constellations, no formalization or specific investment for the group as a whole is involved in 
implicit constellations.  Thus, although implicit constellations may exhibit inertia due to the costs 
to reorganize bilateral ties, inertia will tend to be even stronger in explicit groups because of 
overarching contractual commitments and joint non-redeployable investments, which 
substantially increase exit costs.  In other words:   7
Hypothesis 1.  The tendency of firms to stay in the same constellation over time will be 
stronger for explicit constellations than implicit ones. 
   We are also interested in analyzing the co-evolution of explicit and implicit 
constellations.  On the one hand, membership in the same implicit constellation may turn into 
membership in the same explicit constellation.  We noted earlier that implicit constellations in 
some cases simply represent expanded versions of explicit constellations.  Thus, expanding the 
explicit group by attracting a member of its corresponding implicit constellation—as the bmi 
case discussed before—will tend to economize on search costs and allow partners to build upon 
existing bilateral arrangements.  Furthermore, implicit constellations may be precursors of 
explicit groups, i.e., they may become increasingly formalized over time.  This formalization has 
several advantages.  First, the creation of standardized exchange procedures in explicit groups 
tends to increase compatibility across members’ production and marketing systems, thereby 
enhancing their ability to capture market or technological externalities (Schilling & Steensma, 
2001; Thompson, 1967).  Second, the existence of formal boards and committees in explicit 
constellations facilitates control and improves collective decision-making (Farrell & Saloner, 
1988).  Finally, the formalization of interfirm associations and the creation of brand names bring 
legitimization and visibility to the group, which helps to attract not only new customers but also 
supporting actors such as suppliers and investors (Human & Provan, 2000; Katz & Shapiro, 
1994).  Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2a.  Firms belonging to the same implicit constellation in the past will likely 
belong to the same explicit constellation in the future. 
On the other hand, common membership in an explicit constellation may turn into 
common membership in an implicit constellation.  Some explicit groups may create exclusivity 
agreements aimed at reducing the externalities that a member may generate, via bilateral ties, to 
firms that do not belong to the group.  Also, pursuing joint action with constellation members 
while maintaining extensive outside ties will likely reduce a firm’s commitment to the 
constellation and destabilize the group (Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquist, & Borgatti, 1998).    8
Moreover, because explicit constellations increase firms’ joint action through committees and 
other governance mechanisms, interfirm contact is likely to increase (McPherson, 1982) and lead 
to mutual agreements, via bilateral ties, that extend the activities of the explicit group.  As a 
result, the nexus of bilateral agreements between a set of firms describing an implicit 
constellation may complement general agreements established by those firms in their explicit 
constellation.  This suggests that, over time, firms will likely reorganize their bilateral 
association in a pattern that follows their collective linkage through the explicit group.  Thus:   
Hypothesis 2b.  Firms belonging to the same explicit constellation in the past will likely 
belong to the same implicit constellation in the future. 
Our last hypothesis attempts to predict how the resource profile of firms will influence 
the emergence of explicit and implicit constellations.  The possibility of capturing interfirm 
externalities increases when members hold complementary resources, i.e., when the use of a 
resource increases when it is jointly used with other resources supplied by partners.  This tends 
to occur when firms have specialized roles and hence contribute to the constellation with diverse 
resources that can be combined with one another (Grandori & Soda, 1995; Richardson, 1972; 
Teece, 1992).  For instance, an airline carrier can capture traffic from other carriers servicing 
alternative routes.  Since international regulations prevent a carrier from owning foreign 
infrastructure, that carrier can complement its route network by partnering with firms controlling 
alternative hubs (and their associated routes), thereby pooling traffic emanating from different 
regions.  This suggests that constellations will tend to be formed by firms holding diverse, 
complementary resources (Gomes-Casseres, 1994).  But it is also possible to propose otherwise.  
Proximity and similarity of resource endowments facilitate interfirm monitoring, sharing of 
experiences, and the pursuit of common goals (Caves & Porter, 1977; Darr & Kurtzberg, 2000; 
Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Kraatz, 1998).  For example, a group of airline carriers will more 
easily coordinate their activities if their hubs are geographically close to one another and if they 
have experience with similar routes.  Thus, although resource diversity increases the extent of   9
interfirm externalities available to members, it also makes the internalization of these spillovers 
more difficult. 
We propose that the net effect of resource diversity will depend on whether the 
constellation is explicit or implicit.  As noted before, explicit constellations often involve formal 
agreements and decision-making entities such as boards and committees, which improve control 
and integration of activities.  In contrast, joint action in implicit constellations is to a large extent 
tacit and even unconscious, as a firm may benefit from the externalities generated by other actors 
to which it is not directly linked through a bilateral agreement.  Thus, increasing resource 
diversity in explicit constellations will not substantially tax the ability of the group to coordinate 
its activities because existing formal coordination mechanisms will ameliorate the difficulty in 
articulating dissimilar resource endowments.  Since implicit constellations lack these formal 
mechanisms, resource diversity will undermine interfirm coordination to a larger extent than in 
explicit groups.  Consequently, other things being equal, explicit constellations should support a 
higher level of resource diversity than implicit constellations.  In other words:   
Hypothesis 3.  Resource diversity will influence to a larger degree the formation of an 
explicit constellation involving a group of firms than the formation of an implicit 
constellation with the same firms. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
Our sample includes 75 global airlines representing about 81% of the total world 
passenger traffic in 2000 and 54 distinct countries (Table 1), observed from 1995 to 2000.  The 
data come mostly from the World Air Transport Statistics compiled by the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA), which provides information on airlines’ operations, and the 
Airline Business magazine, which presents annual surveys of bilateral alliances and equity stakes 
between carriers, as well as the composition of explicit constellations in the industry.
1  
<Table 1 around here>   10
Although the composition of explicit constellations is easily obtained through public 
sources, the composition of implicit groups is more difficult to retrieve and requires specific 
methods.  Following previous work (Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991; Vanhaverbeke & 
Noorderhaven, 2001; Walker, 1988), we adopt a clustering approach to demarcating the 
boundaries of implicit constellations, based on the matrix of bilateral ties among carriers in the 
sample.  We employ a clustering algorithm based on tabu search optimization (Glover, 1989), 
available in the software UCINET 5.0 (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 1999), which maximizes a 
“fit” function based on the average “proximity” of group members defined in terms of the 
existence of bilateral ties to one another, given a pre-specified number of groups or partitions.  
Thus, the algorithm has a clear rule for optimizing the composition of groups, which is 
somewhat obscure in other clustering methods (Lawless & Anderson, 1996).  Another advantage 
of this algorithm is that it finds groups given a certain pre-specified number of partitions, 
independent of the clustering configurations found with fewer partitions.
2  To create a matrix of 
interfirm linkages, we simply consider that there is a linkage between two firms (coded 1) when 
they have either a bilateral alliance or an ownership relation (i.e., when at least one of the carriers 
has an equity stake in the other carrier).  Otherwise, we consider that there is no linkage (coded 
0).  Such a matrix is constructed for every year in the sample.
3   
A critical decision in clustering algorithms is to define an “ideal” number of partitions, 
which in our case corresponds to the number of implicit constellations to be found.  We choose 5 
partitions mainly because, in the last year of the sample (2000), there were 5 explicit 
constellations in place.  Since we suggested before that implicit constellations may be either 
precursors of explicit groups or “expanded” versions of such groups, it is natural to find a 
clustering pattern that has some correspondence to the configuration of explicit constellations.  
Another reason is that transatlantic routes between Europe and the United States are considered a 
key target for the formation of global airline alliances.  In this sense, we can assume that the 
major U.S. carriers will be central players in each group.  In our sample, 4 U.S. carriers can be 
considered key international players: American Airlines, Delta, Northwest Airlines, and United   11
Airlines, thus suggesting at least 4 constellations.  Adding an apparent cluster of European 
carriers formerly led by Swissair results in 5 groupings. 
The composition of implicit and explicit groups analyzed in this study is shown in Tables 
2 and 3 respectively.  Table 4, in particular, presents results from the cluster analysis.  A way to 
judge the results is through an analysis of density tables for each year: diagonal entries represent 
the density of bilateral ties among firms within each group (i.e., the total number of observed ties 
divided by the total number of ties that could be possibly formed), whereas off-diagonal entries 
represent the density of bilateral ties among firms belonging to different groups.  Since diagonal 
values are always higher than off-diagonal values, there is an indication that the algorithm 
employed here is capturing the operational definition of an implicit constellation as a cluster of 
firms that have more extensive ties to one another than to firms outside the group.   
<Tables 2 and 3 around here> 
Dependent variable 
  A natural way to model firms’ decision to join a particular constellation would be to use a 
multiple-choice model (such as the multinomial logit) to describe which group a certain firm 
chooses.  In this case, we could create a set of dependent variables coding the participation of 
firms in each group.  This approach is problematic, however, because the set of choices available 
to firms is not fixed, and hence violates the assumption of multiple-choice models that the 
categories of choice are exogenous (Maddala, 1983).  Instead, constellations are continuously 
formed every year, and firms may endogenously choose to ally and form new groups.   
Thus, instead of describing which group firms choose, we must model which firms 
decide to associate with one another in the same constellation.  But this approach can become 
cumbersome if we consider all possible coalitions that firms can create.  Thus, N firms can create 
associations involving two, three, four or more actors, including the grand coalition with N 
members.  To simplify the analysis, we evaluate instead constellation membership in a pair-wise 
way.  Namely, we describe whether two carriers from the sample were observed in the same 
implicit or explicit constellation in a given year.  Notice, therefore, that carriers can be associated   12
in three different ways: they can belong to the same implicit constellation, they can belong to the 
same explicit constellation, or they can be bilaterally tied to one another.  These alternatives are 
not mutually exclusive.  Please refer again to Figure 1.  Although bmi was not a member of any 
explicit group in early 2000, that carrier was part of the same implicit constellation involving 
several members of the Star Alliance (as retrieved by the clustering algorithm discussed above).  
Also, Virgin and South African Airways were members of the same implicit constellation but 
were not bilaterally tied; instead, they were indirectly associated through bmi.  Finally, although 
Varig and Mexicana were members of the same explicit group (Star Alliance), no bilateral tie 
involving these two carriers was observed. 
We therefore create two dependent variables to track a carrier’s membership in implicit 
and explicit constellations: ICijt, coded 1 if carriers i and j belong to the same implicit 
constellation at year t and 0 otherwise; and ECijt, coded 1 if carriers i and j belong to the same 
explicit constellation at year t and 0 otherwise.  
Explanatory variables 
Past membership in constellations.  We use variables ICijt-1 and ECijt-1 to track a firm’s 
past membership in implicit and explicit constellations. These variables are simply the values of 
ICijt and ECijt respectively, lagged one year for the observation period, and are employed to test 
Hypotheses 1, 2a and 2b. 
Resource diversity.  To test Hypothesis 3, we create two variables measuring the resource 
diversity of carries associated in a constellation.  We first define the international positioning of a 
carrier as the ratio of the traffic (RPK) emanating from international passenger flows to the total 
traffic of that carrier.  We then create the variable DIVINTijt, which is the ratio of the largest to 
the smallest international positioning score of firms i and j at year t.  The idea behind the use of 
this variable is that resource diversity in airline constellations depends on whether some 
members specialize in small, domestic markets, while other members specialize in large markets 
with a broad range of international routes.  Thus, Clougherty (2002) shows that a large domestic 
network can improve a carrier’s competitive position in international markets.      13
We also use the variable DISTij, which is simply the distance in kilometers between the 
main hubs of firms i and j.  The main hub of a carrier is defined as the city that, for that particular 
carrier, shows the largest number of departing connections as evidenced by the Traffic by Flight 
Stage database, compiled by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).  We justify 
the use of this variable because diversity regarding alternative routes offered to consumers will 
tend to be greatest when members are positioned in distant cities, which expands the possibilities 
for connections.  By contrast, similar or proximate hubs will more likely be substitutes than 
complements.   
To accommodate possible non-linear effects, we use the logarithm of these resource 
diversity variables in our regressions. 
Control variables 
Past bilateral ties.  Existing bilateral associations between carriers can probably 
influence the dynamics of the formation of implicit and explicit constellations.  For instance, 
existing members of an explicit group may attempt to lure new firms to which they have bilateral 
ties (Gomes-Casseres, 1996: 66).  We therefore create the variable DIRTijt-1, coded 1 if 
companies i and j were associated through a bilateral alliance or ownership relation at year t-1, 
and 0 otherwise.  But indirect bilateral associations may also matter (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999).  Thus, two carriers not connected with one another but bilaterally associated 
with the same partner may become members of the same implicit or explicit constellation.  In 
this sense, we also create the variable INDIRTijt-1, coded 1 if companies i and j were bilaterally 
associated with at least one common partner at year t-1, and 0 otherwise. 
Number of explicit constellations.  As explicit constellations are formed, they may 
become progressively institutionalized as new, legitimate organizational forms in the industry 
(Garcia-Point & Nohria, 2002; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hannan & Freeman, 1989).  Customers, 
suppliers and carriers themselves may become progressively aware of the benefits derived from 
explicit groups—common frequently flyer programs, joint services, shared operations, and so on.  
Thus, the formation of explicit constellations will tend to be reinforced by the number of   14
constellations already in place.  To control for this effect, we add the variable ECTOTt-1, which 
corresponds to the number of explicit alliances observed in the previous year of analysis.  In the 
regressions we use the logarithm of this variable to capture possible non-linear effects. 
Size. To control for differences in size or capacity between firms, we create the variable 
CAPijt, which is the ratio of the passenger available seat capacity (ASK) of both companies 
(greater to lesser value) at year t (e.g. Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999).  We again use the logarithm of 
this variable in the regressions. 
Year-specific controls.  Finally, we create a set of dummy variables representing each 
year in the observation window, denoted as YEAR(t), in order to control for temporal effects 
such as variations in economic and regulatory conditions over time, as well as trends in the 
pattern of interfirm alliances. 
Table 4 presents the description of all variables used in this study.  An inspection of the 
correlation coefficients of the variables (Table 5) shows no possible problem of collinearity. 
<Tables 4 and 5 around here> 
Method 
Since we have two dichotomous dependent variables coding joint membership in explicit 
and implicit constellations, we could run two separate binary choice models (e.g., probit or logit) 
to test our hypotheses.  The problem of running these regressions separately, however, is that 
choices are likely influenced by unobserved factors that jointly affect membership decisions in 
explicit and implicit groups.  For instance, two carriers may create particular agreements, which 
we do not observe, that simultaneously induce them to join the same explicit constellation and 
promote a reorganization of existing bilateral ties, in such a way that they will also become 
members of the same implicit group.  We thus employ the bivarate probit model (Greene, 2000), 
which simultaneously estimates two regressions with related dichotomous variables and hence 
accounts for a possible correlation between stochastic factors affecting both choices.  More 









where ECijt = 1 (i.e., carriers i and j belong to the same explicit group at year t) if yijt
E > 0 and 0 
otherwise; ICijt = 1 (i.e., carriers i and j belong to the same implicit group) if yijt
I > 0 and 0 
otherwise; xijt is a vector of covariates; β
E and β
I are parameter vectors to be estimated; εijt
E and 
εijt
I are stochastic terms jointly distributed according to a bivariate normal with correlation ρ.  
Since partnering choices are observed through several years, we compute robust standard errors 
clustered on each carrier-pair.
4 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 6 presents estimates from bivariate probit regressions.  Model (1) reports results 
with control variables only, and model (2) adds the set explanatory variables to test our 
hypotheses.  A Wald test indicates that explanatory variables significantly improve the fit of the 
regression (χ
2 = 1279.99, p < 0.01).  In all cases, the estimate of ρ is significantly different from 
zero, thus suggesting that the bivariate probit model is warranted: unobserved factors involved in 
carriers’ choice of explicit and implicit groups induce a correlation of the error terms in the 
regressions (p < .01).  Another way to assess this is to compare the bivariate probit results with 
the results obtained by running two independent probit models.  Again, a Wald test comparing 
the relative fit of these alternative specifications favors the bivariate probit model (χ
2 = 19.06 
and 27.82 for models (1) and (2) respectively, both with p < .01).   
<Table 6 around here> 
Before turning to the test of our hypotheses, we provide some brief comments on the 
control variables, which provide themselves an interesting set of results.  The significantly 
positive coefficients of DIRTijt-1 and INDIRTijt-1 indicate that, in our sample, carries holding past 
bilateral ties to one another or indirect associations through a common partner are more likely to 
become members of the same explicit or implicit group (p < .01).  This supports the idea that 
firms tend to form multiple party associations based on actors to which they are already tied in a 
bilateral way.     16
The variable Ln(ECTOTt-1), in turn, shows different signs depending on whether the 
constellation is implicit or explicit.  Consistent with the institutionalization view of the adoption 
of new organizational forms, an increase in the number of explicit constellations formed in the 
previous year significantly increases the likelihood that two carriers will become members of the 
same explicit group (p < .01).  The proliferation of explicit groups, however, reduces the 
likelihood that two carriers will become members of the same implicit group in the future (p < 
.01).  This result is difficult to explain.  Perhaps Ln(ECTOTt-1) is simply capturing some time 
trend in the evolution of implicit constellations.  It appears from Table 2 that in the last periods 
there is a lower concentration of carriers into a single implicit group, thus reducing the likelihood 
that any two carriers will be observed in the same partition.   For instance, while in 1995 there 
was a single major group with 17 carriers (group 2), in 2000 we observe two major groups with 
17 carriers each (groups 2 and 4).  
The coefficient of the final control variable, Ln(CAPijt), reveals that carries with larger 
differences in size (capacity) are significantly more likely to ally through an explicit or implicit 
constellation.  Possibly, carriers with equally large capacities may view themselves more as 
competitors than possible partners, and carriers with equally small capacities may not have 
sufficient scale to warrant membership in constellations whose operations have a global reach.     
We now discuss the results for explanatory variables, introduced in model (2).   
Hypothesis 1 can be tested in our model by comparing the coefficients of ECijt-1 and ICijt-1, which 
code past membership in explicit and implicit constellations respectively.  Since the coefficient 
of ECijt-1 is positively significant in the regression for explicit constellations and the coefficient 
of ICijt-1 is positively significant in the regression for implicit constellations (p < .01), there is 
evidence of inertia: carriers tend to stay in the same constellation over time.  Moreover, the 
coefficient of ECijt-1 in the regression for explicit constellations is significantly larger in 
magnitude than the coefficient of ICijt-1 in the regression for implicit constellations (χ
2 = 131.02, 
p < .01).  This supports Hypothesis 1: inertia tends to be stronger in explicit constellations than   17
in implicit ones, probably because explicit constellations involve mutual investments in non-
redeployable assets and overarching contractual commitments. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b deliver predictions about the co-evolution of implicit and explicit 
constellations.  Support for Hypothesis 2a requires that the coefficient of ICijt-1 should be positive 
in the regression for explicit constellations.  This what we observe in the data: past membership 
in the same implicit constellation significantly leads to future membership in the same explicit 
constellation (p < .01).  Hypothesis 2b, in turn, predicts that the coefficient of ECijt-1 should be 
positive in the regression for implicit constellations.  This hypothesis is rejected: past 
membership in the same explicit constellation does not significantly lead to future membership 
in the same implicit constellation.   
These results confirm that implicit constellations may be “precursors” of explicit groups, 
but reject the idea that membership in the same explicit constellation will tend to promote a 
reorganization of firms’ bilateral ties such as they will tend to become members of the same 
implicit group.  A possible explanation is that members of an explicit group tend to focus on 
areas of overlapping strategic interest—for instance, transatlantic routes and their continental 
legs—and leave other activities to bilateral ties that are independently managed by firms 
according to their local conditions and strategies.  In other words, forming an explicit group does 
not preclude carriers from partnering with a different set of firms via an implicit constellation.  
However, members of an implicit constellation will in the future likely become members of the 
explicit constellation to which their major partners belong.  Note, in particular, that we observe 
this result even after controlling for past direct and indirect bilateral ties between carriers.  Thus, 
carriers most likely to be members of the same explicit constellation are not only those with 
direct or indirect bilateral ties, but also those associated with the same group of firms that have 
more ties to one another than to other firms in the industry—i.e., carriers that belong to the same 
implicit constellation. 
Finally, Hypothesis 3 predicts that the formation of explicit constellations should be more 
strongly influenced by the resource diversity of partners than the formation of implicit   18
constellations.  We can test this hypothesis by assessing the coefficient of our two proxies for 
resource diversity, the difference in international positioning of partners (Ln(DIVINTijt)) and the 
distance between their main hubs (Ln(DISTijt)).  The coefficient of Ln(DIVINTijt) is significantly 
positive in the regression of explicit constellations (p < .05), but is significantly negative in the 
regression for implicit constellations (p < .01).  This supports Hypothesis 3 in a stronger way 
than what we predicted: resource diversity not only influences to a larger degree the formation of 
explicit constellations, but is also negatively associated with the formation of implicit 
constellations.   As for Ln(DIVINTijt), the coefficient of this variable is insignificant in the 
regression for explicit constellations but is negatively significant in the regression for implicit 
groups (p < .01).  Thus, Hypothesis 3 is rejected when we take the distance between partners’ 
main hubs as a measure of resource diversity.  However, this result confirms that resource 
similarity plays a role in the formation of implicit constellations.  Apparently, this reflects the 
tradeoffs involved in exploiting resource diversity.  While diversity increases the externalities 
that constellation members can potentially internalize, this internalization is particularly difficult 
if the alliance does not have formal agreements and coordinating entities—which are available in 
explicit constellations but absent in implicit ones. 
Thus, while partners with diverse resources are more likely to become members of the 
same explicit group, partners with similar resources are more likely to become members of the 
same implicit group.   This suggests an interesting dynamics for the co-evolution of implicit and 
explicit groups.  Explicit constellations may expand by incorporating firms holding diverse 
resources and that are more bilaterally associated with key members of the explicit group than to 
other firms in the industry.  At the same time, members of an explicit group may create implicit 
associations with partners holding resources that are similar to their own resources, thereby 
creating a cluster of firms adjacent to the explicit constellation.  Once formed, the explicit group 
will exhibit inertia: members will tend to stay together for some time, at least longer than 
implicit interfirm associations.             
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study contributes to the literature on the formation of interfirm alliances by moving 
beyond the focus on bilateral ties and assessing how alliances between multiple partners, 
commonly referred to as constellations, emerge over time.  Using data from the global airline 
industry, we make an initial attempt to illuminate this issue.  Airline carriers not only create 
formal groupings in a multilateral fashion—which we call explicit constellations—but also 
engage in a web of bilateral ties configuring alternative groups of firms that have more bilateral 
ties to one another than to firms outside their group—which we call implicit constellations.    
We find that explicit and implicit constellations co-evolve in an interesting way.  Explicit 
constellations tend to grow by luring firms that are associated with key members through an 
implicit group.  Thus, apparently implicit constellations are precursors of explicit groups: they 
tend to be progressively formalized over time.  However, explicit constellations more likely 
expand by attracting firms holding resources that are dissimilar to the resources of other 
members.  And once explicit associations are formed, they tend to persist more over time than 
implicit groups, possibly due to the larger non-redeployable investments and contractual 
commitments required for their formation.   
We note, however, that this is an exploratory study with important limitations.  The 
airline industry presents many particularities that prevent a generalization of our results to other 
contexts.  For instance, the international traffic in the industry is heavily regulated, which 
certainly influences alliance decisions.  Also, the industry has witnessed an expansion in bilateral 
ties and constellations that may be unparalleled in other contexts.  Nonetheless, we believe that 
our study can potentially guide future research in other industries.  Consider, for instance, the 
microprocessor industry.   Firms have not only established clusters of bilateral alliances 
(involving, for instance, technology licensing and marketing), but also formal consortiums for 
R&D and production (Axelrod et al., 1995; Hwang & Burgers, 1997; Vanhaverbeke & 
Noorderhaven, 2001).  Similarly to the present study, one could track how these informal and   20
formal interfirm associations change over time and try to find proxies for resource diversity to 
test the hypotheses suggested here.    
We should also point out that although the composition of explicit groups is easily 
observable through public sources, the analysis of implicit constellations crucially depends on 
the quantitative method employed to split firms into groups.  Although the tabu search 
optimization algorithm employed here is an improvement over usual methods such as 
hierarchical clustering, it still requires restrictive assumptions about interfirm linkages—for 
instance, what is the “ideal” number of partitions to be found.  Further research on alternative 
methods to retrieve implicit constellations based on the network of bilateral ties between firms is 
crucial to improve our understanding on how formal and informal networks change and co-
evolve. 
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1 We assume that a carrier is a member of an explicit constellation in a given year if it announced 
its association to the group in the first half of that year, i.e., between January and June.  If an 
explicit constellation is dissolved in a given year, we assume that the group is in place in that 
year if the termination occurs in the second half of that year. 
2 Conventional hierarchical clustering algorithms, in contrast, present the undesirable property 
that a partition “made at one of the early stages of the analysis cannot be undone at a later stage” 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994: 385).  The hierarchical clustering algorithm CONCOR has still 
another major drawback: it promotes successive splits of existing sets in exactly two new 
subsets.  These criteria may not be an actual feature of the data in hand (Wasserman & Faust, 
1994: 380). 
3 In some cases, the clustering algorithm groups together some carriers that do not have direct 
ties, or that show only pair-wise, isolated ties.  These carriers probably have a pattern of bilateral 
ties that do not allow for their classification in any group.   Thus, we consider that they do not 
belong to any implicit group.  For more detailed information on the clustering procedure adopted 
here, see Lazzarini (2002). 
4 Since the data have a panel structure, the bivariate probit model may yield biased results since 
it does not account for within-pair correlation of the error terms.  Random-effects regressions for 
explicit and implicit constellations, however, yield identical results (not reported here).   22
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Network of airline carriers comprising the “Star Alliance” constellation in early 2000 (the dashed circle) and carriers that are 
associated through bilateral ties (the thin lines, representing either bilateral alliances or equity stakes)   28
TABLE 1 
Airline carriers included in the sample 
Carrier name (abbreviation)  Traffic*  Country  Carrier name (abbreviation)  Traffic*  Country 
Aer Lingus (LIN)  8.889  Ireland  Japan Air System (JAS)  15.472  Japan 
Aeroflot  (AFL)  16.557 Russia  Japan  Airlines  (JA)  88.999 Japan 
Aerolineas Argentinas (ARG)  11.111  Argentina  KLM Royal Dutch Airl. (KLM)  60.331  Netherlands 
Aeromexico (AMX)  14.390  Mexico  Korean Air (KOR)  40.467  South Korea 
Air Algerie (ALG)  3.051  Algeria  LanChile (LCH)  9.931  Chile 
Air Canada (AC)  44.806  Canada  Lauda Air (LAU)  4.562  Austria 
Air China (CHI)  18.116  China  Lloyd Aero Boliviano (LAB)  1.701  Bolivia 
Air France (AFR)  91.801  France  LOT Polish Airlines (LOT)  4.757  Poland 
Air-India (IND)  12.006  India  Lufthansa (LFH)  94.170  Germany 
Air Liberte (LIB)  4.707  France  Malaysia Airlines (MA)  37.947  Malaysia 
Air New Zealand (ANZ)  22.232  New Zealand  Malev Hungarian Airlines (MAL)  3.168  Hungary 
Alaska Airlines (ALA)  19.273  United States  Mexicana de Aviacion (MEX)  13.498  Mexico 
Alitalia (ALI)  40.618  Italy  Northwest Airlines (NW)  127.324  United States 
All Nippon Airways (ANA)  58.042  Japan  Olympic Airways (OLY)  8.860  Greece 
America West Airlines (AW)  30.742  United States  Qantas Airways (QUA)  63.495  Australia 
American Airlines (AA)  187.542  United States  Royal Air Maroc (RAM)  7.185  Morocco 
Ansett Australia (ANS)  17.110  Australia  Royal Jordanian Airlines (RAJ)  4.207  Jordan 
AOM French Airlines (AOM)  9.248  France  Sabena (SAB)  19.379  Belgium 
Austrian Airlines (AUS)  8.799  Austria  Scandinavian Airlines (SAS)  22.647  Sweden 
Balkan Bulgarian (BAL)  0.808  Bulgaria  Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAU)  20.229  Saudi Arabia 
British Airways (BA)  118.890  United Kingdom  Singapore Airlines (SIN)  70.795  Singapore 
British Midland (BMI)  3.837  United Kingdom  South African Airways (SAA)  19.321  South Africa 
Canadian Airlines Intern. (CAI)  23.395  Canada  Sri Lankan Airlines (SLA)  6.860  Sri Lanka 
Cathay Pacific (CP)  47.097  Hong Kong  Swissair (SWR)  34.246  Switzerland 
Continental Airlines (CO)  96.949  United States  Syrian Arab Airlines (SYR)  1.422  Syria 
Croatia Airlines (CRO)  0.644  Croatia  TAP Air Portugal (TAP)  10.385  Portugal 
Crossair (CRS)  2.073  Switzerland  TAROM (TAR)  2.075  Romania 
CSA Czech Airlines (CSA)  3.294  Czech Republic  Thai Airways International (TAI)  42.236  Thailand 
Cyprus Airways (CYP)  2.785  Cyprus  Trans World Airlines (TWA)  43.798  United States 
Delta Air Lines (DL)  173.411  United States  Tunisair (TUN)  2.694  Tunisia 
Egyptair (EGY)  9.086  Egypt  Turkish Airlines THY (THY)  16.492  Turkey 
El Al (EL)  14.125  Israel  Ukraine Intern. Airlines (UKR)  0.401  Ukraine 
Emirates (EMI)  19.413  Un. Arab Emirates  United Airlines (UA)  204.187  United States 
Finnair (FIN)  7.460  Finland  US Airways (USAir) (USA)  75.380  United States 
GB Airways (GB)  1.971  United Kingdom  Varig (VRG)  26.286  Brazil 
Gulf Air (GUL)  12.739  Bahrain  VASP Brazilian Airlines (VSP)  4.918  Brazil 
Iberia Airlines (IBR)  40.015  Spain  Virgin Atlantic Airways (VIR)  29.471  United Kingdom 
Iran  Air  (IRA)  6.229 Iran      
* Passenger traffic in 2000, billion RPK (revenue passenger kilometers), from IATA’s World Air Transport Statistics. 
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TABLE 2 
Description of implicit constellations 
Year/ Members
a  Density table
b 






1995 1  LIN, AMX, ALA, AW, BA, CO, GB, KLM, MEX, NW, USA.  .22      
 2  AFL, AC, CHI, AFR, ANA, AUS, BAL, CSA, DL, FIN, IBR, LOT, LFH, MLV, SAB, SWR, TAR, THY.  .04  .36     
 3  ARG, IND, ANS, BMI, EMI, MA, RAJ, SLA, TAP, TWA, UA, VIR.  .00  .06  .24    
 4  ALG, ALI, CYP, EGY, GUL, IRA, KOR, OLY, RAM, SAU, SYR, TUN.  .03  .06  .04  .23   
 5  ANZ, AA, CAI, CP, JAS, JA, LAB, QUA, SAS, SIN, SAA, TAI, VRG, VSP.  .04  .06  .04  .02  .23 
1996 1  LIN, LIB, ANZ, AW, BA, CAI, GB, LCH, NW, QUA, SAS, USA, VRG.  .22      
 2  AFL, AMX, ALG, AFR, BAL, CRO, EGY, MEX, RAM, TUN, THY.  .00  .24     
 3  ARG, AA, ANS, BMI, CP, JAS, JA, MA, RAJ, SIN, SAA, SLA, TAP, TAI, VIR.  .05  .01  .25    
 4  AC, CHI, ALI, ANA, AUS, CO, CSA, DL, FIN, IBR, KOR, LAU, LOT, LFH, MLV, SAB, SWR, TAR.  .05  .06  .08  .35   
 5  IND, CYP, EMI, GUL, IRA, KLM, LAB, OLY, SAU, SYR, TWA, UA, VSP.  .03  .03  .04  .04  .22 
1997 1  LIN, CHI, ALA, AW, DL, EL, FIN, KLM, KOR, NW, SAB, SIN, TAP.  .26      
 2  AFL, AMX, AFR, ALI, AUS, BAL, CO, CRO, CSA, IBR, LOT, MLV, SWR, TAR, THY, UKR.  .08  .39     
 3  ARG, AC, IND, ANZ, ANS, BMI, CP, EMI, LAU, LFH, MA, SAS, SAA, SLA, TAI, UA, VIR.  .04  .05  .29    
 4  ALG, CYP, EGY, GUL, IRA, LAB, OLY, RAM, SAU, SYR, TUN, VSP.  .01  .06  .03  .20   
 5  LIB, ANA, AA, BA, CAI, GB, JAS, JA, MEX, QUA, VRG.  .04  .04  .07  .01  .25 
1998 1  LIN, AOM, CRO, EGY, LAU, MA, OLY, RAJ, SAB, SLA, TAP, THY.  .20      
 2  AFL, AMX, CHI, AFR, IND, ALI, AUS, BAL, CSA, DL, FIN, IBR, KOR, LOT, MLV, SWR, TAR, UKR.  .10  .39     
 3  ARG, AW, AA, BA, CAI, CO, JAS, JA, LCH, LAB, QUA, VSP.  .01  .07  .26    
 4  ALG, ALA, CYP, GUL, IRA, KLM, NW, RAM, SAU, SYR, TWA, TUN.  .03  .06  .03  .23   
 5  AC, ANZ, ANA, ANS, BMI, EMI, LFH, MEX, SAS, SIN, SAA, TAI, UA, VIR.  .06  .06  .05  .02  .38 
1999 1  LIN, ALG, AOM, CYP, EL, FIN, OLY, RAM, SAB, TAP, TUN.  .24      
 2  AFL, AMX, CHI, AFR, IND, AUS, BAL, CSA, DL, IBR, KOR, LOT, MLV, SWR, TAR, UKR.  .09  .41     
 3  AC, ANZ, ANA, ANS, BMI, EMI, LFH, MEX, SAS, SIN, SAA, TAI, UA, VRG, VIR.  .01  .05  .42    
 4  ALA, ALI, AW, AA, BA, CAI, CO, JAS, JA, KLM, LCH, NW, QUA.  .05  .10  .05  .38   
 5  CRO, EGY, GUL, IRA, MA, RAJ, SLA, SYR, TWA, THY.  .03  .11  .07  .04  .31 
2000 1  LIN, ARG, AA, BA, CAI, CP, EL, FIN, LCH, QUA, SAB, TAP.  .41      
 2  AFL, AFR, ALI, AUS, BAL, CRO, CSA, IBR, IRA, JA, LOT, MLV, RAJ, SWR, SYR, TAR, THY.  .13  .43     
 3  AMX, ALG, CYP, DL, EGY, GUL, OLY, RAM, TUN.  .05  .09  .22    
 4  AC, IND, ANZ, ANA, BMI, EMI, LAU, LFH, MA, MEX, SAS, SIN, SAA, SLA, TAI, UA, VIR.  .03  .09  .03  .38   
 5  CHI, ALA, AW, ANS, CO, JAS, KLM, KOR, NW, TWA, UKR.  .07  .06  .01  .05  .29 
a Abbreviations of names as listed in Table 1. Composition of groups as revealed by clustering algorithm based on the matrix of bilateral 
ties among firms. 
b Diagonal entries indicate density of constellation.  Off-diagonal entries indicate density of ties between constellation members and 
members of other groups. 
Sources: IATA’s World Air Transport Statistics; Airline Business, several issues; analyses reported in Lazzarini (2002). 
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TABLE 3 
Description of explicit constellations 
Year Name  Date  founded  Members
a 
1995 Global  Excellence
  1990  DL, SIN, SWR. 
1996 Global  Excellence
  1990  DL, SIN, SWR. 
1997  Atlantic Excellence  Feb 1997  AUS, DL, SAB, SWR. 
 Global  Excellence
b  1990  DL, SIN, SWR. 
  Star Alliance  May 1997  AC, LFH, SAS, TAI, UA.
c 
1998  Atlantic Excellence  Feb 1997  AUS, DL, SAB, SWR. 
  Qualiflyer  May 1998  AOM, AUS, CRS, LAU, SAB, SWR, TAP, THY. 
  Star Alliance  May 1997  AC, LFH, SAS, TAI, UA, VRG. 
1999 Atlantic  Excellence
d  Feb 1997  AUS, DL, SAB, SWR. 
 Oneworld
  Sep 1998  AA, BA, CAI, CP, QUA.
e 
  Qualiflyer  May 1998  AOM, AUS, CRS, SAB, SWR, TAP, THY.
f 
  Star Alliance  May 1997  AC, ANZ, ANS, LFH, SAS, TAI, UA, VRG. 
 “Wings”
g  1999 KLM,  NW. 
2000  Oneworld  Sep 1998  LIN, AA, BA, CP, FIN, IBR, LCH, QUA. 
  Qualiflyer  May 1998  LIB, AOM, CRS, LOT, SAB, SWR, TAP, THY.
h 
  SkyTeam  Sep 1999  AMX, AFR, DL.
i 
  Star Alliance  May 1997  AC, ANZ, ANA, ANS, AUS, LFH, MEX, SAS, SIN, TAI, UA, VRG.
j 
 “Wings”  1999  KLM,  NW. 
a Abbreviations of names as listed in Table 1. 
b Dissolved in November 1997. 
c Varig joined the group in October 1997. 
d Dissolved in November 1999. 
e Finnair and Iberia joined the group in September 1999. 
f Air Europe is also a member, but was not included in the analysis due to missing data.  However, estimates indicate that 
it contributes to only about 6.2% of the constellation’s total traffic. 
g “Wings” is an unofficial name of the group.  The alliance between KLM and Northwest exists since 1989, but we 
consider that the group was only officially institutionalized with the announcement that Continental and Alitalia would 
join the group in early 1999, which was later called off. 
h Air Littoral, Portugalia and Volare are also members, but were not included in the analysis due to missing data.  
However, estimates indicate that they, together, contribute to only about 2.4% of the constellation’s total traffic. 
i Korean Airlines joined the group in July 2000. 
j British Midland (bmi) joined the group in July 2000. 
Sources: IATA’s World Air Transport Statistics; Airline Business, several issues; analyses reported in Lazzarini (2002). 
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TABLE 4 
Description of variables 
   Expected  sign
c 




Dependent      
ECijt  Dummy variable coded 1 if carriers i and j are in the 
same explicit constellation at year t, and 0 otherwise. 
  
ICijt  Dummy variable coded 1 if carriers i and j are in the 
same explicit constellation at year t, and 0 otherwise. 
  
Explanatory      
ECijt-1  The lagged value of dependent variable ECijt. ++  + 
ICijt-1  The lagged value of dependent variable ICijt. +  + 
DIVINTijt  Ratio of carriers’ international positioning (traffic 
coming from international passenger flows to the 
total traffic of the carrier, in RPK
a), greater to lesser 
value, at year t. 
+ +/0 
DISTij  Distance in kilometers between the main hubs of 
companies i and j. 
+ +/0 
Control      
DIRTijt-1  Dummy variable coded 1 if carriers i and j had a 
bilateral tie at year t-1, and 0 otherwise. 
NP NP 
INDIRTijt-1  Dummy variable coded 1 if carriers i and j had an 
indirect bilateral association (i.e., they were 
bilaterally connected to the same partner) at year t-1, 
and 0 otherwise. 
NP NP 
ECTOTt-1  Number of explicit constellations at year t.  NP  NP 
CAPijt  Ratio of carriers’ passenger available seat capacity 
(ASK
b), greater to lesser value, at year t. 
NP NP 
YEAR(t)  Set of dummy variables coded 1 if the observation is 
from year t and 0 otherwise. 
NP NP 
a RPK = revenue passenger kilometers. 
b ASK = available seat kilometers. 
c NP = not predicted.   32
TABLE 5 
Descriptive statistics (N = 16650) 
     Correlations 
   M e a n   S d . D e v .123456789 1 0  
1 ECijt 0.016  0.124 1          
2 ICijt  0.141  0.348 0.126 1         
3 ECijt-1  0.008  0.091 0.597 0.080 1        
4 ICijt-1  0.138  0.345 0.119 0.418 0.101 1       
5 Ln(DIVINTijt)  0.675  0.843 -0.010 -0.090 -0.012 -0.075 1      
6 Ln(DISTij)  8.512  1.165 -0.028 -0.085 -0.034 -0.084 0.168 1     
7 DIRTijt-1  0.080  0.271 0.183 0.307 0.170 0.346 -0.071 -0.148 1    
8 INDIRTijt-1 0.383  0.486 0.125 0.260 0.107 0.288 -0.179 -0.063 0.177 1    
9 Ln(ECTOTt-1) 0.944  0.697 0.095 -0.009 0.073 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.081 1  
10 Ln(CAPijt) 1.500  1.090 -0.047 -0.052 -0.037 -0.059 -0.004 0.024 -0.015 -0.065 -0.003 1 
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TABLE 6 
Bivariate probit estimates:
a factors influencing the likelihood that carriers i and j will be 
observed in the same explicit (ECijt = 1) or implicit constellation (ICijt = 1) ay year t 
 
 (1) (2)   






































































**    
Log likelihood  -6717.89 -5972.99     
χ
2 (Wald test of regression)   1683.22 ** 3284.69 **     
χ
2 (Wald test of ρ = 0)  19.06 **     27.82 **     
a N = 16429. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustering on each carrier-pair ij.  All 
models include year-specific dummy variables (not reported here). 
** p < .01 
* p < .05 
 
 
 
 